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Abstract 
Signals and cues are fundamental to social interactions. A well-established concept in 
the study of animal communication is an amplifier, defined as a trait that does not add 
extra information to that already present in the original cue or signal, but rather 
enhances the fidelity with which variation in the original cue or signal is correctly 
perceived. Attenuators as the logical compliment of amplifiers: attenuators act to reduce 
the fidelity with which variation in a signal or cue can be reliably evaluated by the 
perceivers. Where amplifiers reduce the effect of noise on the perception of variation, 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
attenuators add noise. Attenuators have been subject to much less consideration than 
amplifiers, however they will be the focus of our theoretical study. We utilise an 
extension of a well-established model incorporated signal or cue inaccuracy and costly 
investments by emitter and perceiver in sending and attending to the signal or cue. We 
present broad conditions involving some conflict of interest between emitter and 
perceiver where it may be advantageous for emitters to invest in costly attenuators to 
mask cues from potential perceivers, and a subset of these conditions where the 
perceiver may be willing to invest in costly anti-attentuators to mitigate the loss of 
information to them. We demonstrate that attenuators can be evolutionary stable even 
if they are costly, even if they are sometimes disadvantageous, and even if a perceiver 
can mount counter-measures to them. As such, we feel that attenuators of cues may be 
deserving of much more research attention.  
 
Keywords: signalling, communication, cues, amplifiers, costly signals 
 
Introduction 
Interactions between organisms often involve the behaviour of individuals being influenced 
through stimulation of their senses by traits of other individuals. That is, the behaviour of 
individuals is responsive to sensory stimulations triggered by either unselected cues, 
produced by other individuals, or signals, whose form has been influenced in part by the 
effect they have on the sensory systems of others. Such communication has been extensively 
studied (see Maynard Smith & Harper 2003; Searcy & Nowicki 2005; Bradbury & 
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Vehrencamp 2011 for reviews), and is fundamental to processes such as mate choice, 
parental care, and diet choice.  
Let us call the individual that bears the traits the emitter, and the individual whose sensory 
systems are stimulated by those traits in a way that influences its subsequent behaviour, the 
perceiver. Of course, an individual can switch between these roles, or even play both roles 
simultaneously, but there is no loss of generality from our focus on the simple case of fixed 
roles. If the two individuals are interacting, then the nature of the traits expressed by the 
emitter can have a direct bearing on its fitness, for example influencing whether or not the 
perceiver attempts to mate with it, feed it, or attack it. This concept has been at the heart of 
our understanding of how signals can evolve for the primary purpose of influencing the 
behaviour of others (e.g. such as exaggerated features or coloration used in mate choice).  
One aspect of such communication is the concept of an amplifier. This concept was 
introduced by Hasson (1989). Consider an example situation where there is a cue or signal 
that females use to select which males to mate with. This could be a simple physical 
characteristic, such as body size, or in the form of a sexual ornament, such as: antlers, tusks, 
horns, feathers, tail patterns, or other ornamental colouration. There must clearly be variation 
in the detected trait that allows females to differentiate between males. It is likely that the 
trait that stimulates their senses is correlated with traits that are linked to quality; that is, the 
variation in the trait is informative about variation in males in terms of their quality as a mate. 
For example, in red jungle fowl (Gallus gallus), females have been found to select males 
based on eye colour and comb size and colour; these traits are associated with mate condition 
and parasite resistance (Zuk et al. 1990a, b, c, d). Hasson introduced the concept of an 
amplifier as a trait that did not add extra information to that already present in the original 
cue or signal, but rather enhanced the fidelity with which variation in the original cue or 
signal was correctly perceived. For example, it might be that red colouration on the breast of 
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a bird is a cue or signal used by females, who prefer males with a greater extent of red on the 
breast. If all males adopt a courtship dance which involves displaying their breast 
prominently to females, then this can be considered an amplifier. The dance is performed 
identically by all males, so the dance itself is not a means of differentiating between males; 
however, the dance allows females to evaluate the extent of red colouration on the breast 
more reliably. Such amplifiers are an accepted aspect of the evolution of signal form (e.g. 
Maynard Smith & Harper 2003) and their importance to the evolution of signals has recently 
been subject of careful theoretical investigation (e.g. Hackett et al. 2016, Bogaardt & 
Johnstone 2016). However, Hasson et al. (1992) introduced attenuators as the logical 
complement to amplifiers: attenuators act to reduce the fidelity with which variation in a 
signal or cue can be reliably evaluated by the perceivers. Where amplifiers reduce the effect 
of noise on the perception of variation, attenuators add noise. Attenuators have been subject 
to much less consideration than amplifiers. Essentially, the concept of attenuators where 
introduced as the logical complement of amplifiers by Hasson (1989), although he did not 
explore evolutionary aspects of such traits. Since then the only development was that of 
Bogaardt & Johnstone (2016) demonstrated that amplifiers (and thus by analogy attentuators) 
can easily evolve to become informative and become a signal in their own right. Here we will 
focus on discussing the circumstances that should select for the evolution and maintenance of 
attentuators, and also of countermeasures against them (which we term “anti-attentuators”).  
Emitters might be selected to use an attenuator (even if it is costly to produce) if there is 
conflict of interest (at least sometimes) between the emitter and perceiver. That is, if the 
accurate evaluation of the cue or signal causes the perceiver to act in a way that imposes a 
cost on the emitter, then emitters may be selected to reduce the accuracy of such a cue or 
signal.  
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An example of this might be seen in the interaction between great tits (Parus major) and pied 
flycatchers (Ficedula hypoleuca) in a selection of nest boxes at various sites in Finland, 
studied by Jukka Forsman and collaborators (see Loukola et al. 2014 and references therein). 
Resident great tits select nest boxes and begin nesting before the arrival of migratory 
flycatchers. It has been shown that flycatchers inspect nest boxes and preferentially take up 
residence in vacant nest boxes near to those occupied by great tits that have produced large 
clutches of eggs. This may be adaptive if locally large great tit clutches are indicative of 
locally high food availability. Such inspection involves a cost to flycatchers, not just in time 
and energy but also an injury or even mortality risk if they are discovered in a nest box by the 
returning resident great tit. Further, there is a cost to great tits when flycatchers nest nearby, 
expressed as reduced fledging success, and likely driven by local competition between tits 
and flycatchers for food to feed chicks. Loukola et al. (2014) showed that great tits covered 
their eggs with nest material each time they departed from the nest box when subject to 
experimental treatments designed to indicate presence of flycatchers, but not in a control 
treatment involving another bird species. The authors conclude that this covering behaviour 
acts to deprive the flycatchers of information about clutch size. Although this has yet to be 
demonstrated conclusively, it does seem the most plausible explanation. In terms introduced 
earlier, we see clutch size as a cue produced by great tits that provides useful information to 
flycatchers about food quality in the local environment. High food quality in the area will 
lead to successful foraging by great tits, better quality reproductive individuals, and result in 
greater reproductive rates, evidenced by clutch size. This information is acted upon by 
flycatchers in their nest site choices, and the covering behaviour by the great tits is a trait that 
reduces the fidelity of the information available to the flycatchers.  
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In general, we would expect that attenuators will often be costly for the emitter, and grow 
more costly the more they erode signal or cue accuracy. In the nest box example, there are 
time and energy costs associated with bringing extra nesting material into the box for the 
purpose of egg covering (as observed by Loukala et al. 2014), and in the effort taken to cover 
the eggs prior to departure and uncover them again later; the eggs must be uncovered again in 
order for contact-incubation, where parents’ brood patches must be directly contacting eggs 
to regulate heat transfer and monitor temperatures (Boulton & Cassey, 2012; DuRant et al., 
2013). The greater the investment in these covering behaviours, the more fully the eggs can 
be covered, and the more effective the attenuator is in reducing the informational content of 
the cue, but there will be diminishing returns on ever greater investment. Sometimes the 
perceiver may be able to evolve what we term anti-attenuators that reduce the effectiveness 
of attenuators. For example, Loukola et al. (2014) report that flycatchers will enter nest boxes 
and remove material from the top of the covered eggs. We would expect that there is a cost to 
anti-attenuators, in general, that increases with the extent to which they reduce noise added 
by the attenuator. In the nest box example, given enough time investment, a flycatcher can 
likely fully uncover eggs no matter how deeply they are buried, but the more time it spends in 
such activity, the greater the time, energy and mortality costs.  
Our aim in this paper is to explore the circumstances under which emitters will invest in 
attenuators and perceivers in anti-attenuators.  To explore the issues described above, we 
utilise an extension of the well-established model of Bradbury & Vehrencamp (2000). Their 
model incorporated signal or cue inaccuracy and costly investments by emitter and perceiver 
in sending and attending to the signal or cue. In previous papers (Hackett et al. 2014, 2016), 
we introduced a functional linkage between these two issues, and assumed that while both 
emitter and perceiver can exert some control over signal or cue fidelity, increasing levels of 
control are increasingly costly. However, in our previous work we assumed that investment 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
by either party only served to improve signal or cue fidelity, via amplifiers. Here we are 
interested in the fundamentally different case where we expect emitters to potentially deploy 
attenuators that erode the fidelity with which perceivers detect variation in the form of a cue.  
Methods  
The core structure of the model remains unchanged from that of Bradbury and 
Vehrencamp (2000) and Hackett et al. (2014, 2016). A perceiver is subject to one of two 
mutually-exclusive conditions (        ) and may choose to adopt one of two possible 
actions (   or   ). We assume that condition     occurs with probability    and condition    
occurs with probability        . The payoff to the perceiver for selecting action   when 
condition   applies is   . We further assume that    is the optimal action when    applies 
(        ) and define W1 as         as the benefit of taking the optimal action when 
condition 1 pertains; while    is the optimal action in    (       ) with W2 being 
defined similarly. We anticipate that an optimal perceiver will always try to select the course 
of action that maximises its fitness. Yet, the perceiver does not know which condition applies 
and would thus benefit from information relating to the prevailing condition. The emitter has 
information about the prevailing condition, and that information is available to the perceiver 
in the form of a cue produced by the emitter (in the absence of investment in an attenuator by 
the emitter). However, this cue might not provide unambiguous information on prevailing 
conditions. These assumptions mirror those of Hackett et al. (2014, 2016). The key difference 
in the model explored here, is that we are interested in situations where there is conflict of 
interest between perceiver and emitter in at least one of the conditions, such that the cue is 
potentially disadvantageous to the emitter.  Further,, the emitter might have a means to invest 
in an attenuator that reduces the informational value of the cue; but the perceiver can counter 
this with investment in an anti-attenuator that mitigates the effects of the attenuator.  
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As in Hackett et al. (2014, 2016)., the payoff to the emitter when the perceiver selects 
action   in condition   is    . If         and         then the interests of the sender and 
perceiver are always congruent, otherwise there is at least a partial conflict of interest. Ti is 
the benefit to the emitter of the perceiver taking the emitter’s preferred action when condition 
i pertains. Just as the perceiver seeks to maximise its fitness by minimising losses – of, for 
example, time and energy – due to incorrect decisions, the emitter aims to maximise its 
fitness by influencing the decision-making processes of the perceiver such that the perceiver 
selects the emitter’s preferred action for the current condition.  
One barrier to effective influencing by the emitter may be an instance where the 
perceiver changes its behaviour in a way that costs the emitter as a result of information 
received in the cue. In order to reduce such costs, the emitter could invest in attenuation of 
the cue. The emitter pays costs in order to attenuate the cue, with increasing levels of 
attenuating being increasingly costly but also increasingly effective in reducing the influence 
of the cue on the perceiver. Attenuators thus need to outweigh these costs by changing the 
responses of the perceiver with sufficient frequency in ways that benefit the emitter. We 
assume that the emitter always produces a cue, but may or may not additionally invest in an 
attenuator. The description of investment in these attenuators by the emitter and in anti-
attenuation traits by the perceiver are the only ways in which the model here deviates from 
that of Hackett et al. (2014, 2016).   
 The accuracy of the cue (as perceived) is denoted by   representing the conditional 
probability that the perceiver will interpret the cue as describing the correct condition and 
therefore perform the most beneficial action for itself under this condition. We retain the 
simplifying assumption of Bradbury and Vehrencamp (2000) that the accuracy values are 
identical in each condition. Since the entity of interest to the perceiver has two levels (C1 and 
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C2), we can expect that the emitter can produce one of two possible cues (   or    , with 
some (generally less than perfect) association between the specific levels of C and S.  Since 
these are arbitrary, we can assume without any loss of generality that (in the mind of the 
perceiver) S1 is associated with C1 and S2 with C2  In the presence of cues, the perceiver 
detects the correct cue (S1 in C1 and S2 in C2) with probability Q, and the incorrect cue with 
probability 1-Q. Higher values of Q represent more accurate information. For a cue to be 
useful to the perceiver, Q must assume a value greater than 0.5 (which represents chance for a 
binary choice).  
 In the absence of attending to the cue, the perceiver is expected to assume that one 
default condition (C1 or C2) always pertains (we call this the insular strategy; and, for the 
parameter values used throughout this study, this strategy is to assume that C1 always 
applies). Attending to cues has the potential to allow the perceiver some ability to correctly 
identify situations where the non-default condition (C2) pertains. However, attending to the 
cue also introduces the risk of the perceiver mistakenly acting as if the non-default condition 
(C2) pertains in cases where the insular strategy would have caused it to take the best 
behavioural option. Crucially, the benefits of attending to cues must outweigh the cost of 
errors. Thus, there are two major costs for the perceiver of attending to the cue under this 
framework. First is the efficiency cost of any investment in anti-attenuators. Second is the 
cost incurred by the decrease in the rate of correct decisions in the default condition as a 
consequence of imperfect coding (either the wrong cue has been transmitted and/or the 
correct cue has been misunderstood). We call the perceiver  strategy that involves acting as if 
the condition suggested by the state of the cue pertains the conditional strategy.  
Note that it does not always pay for the perceiver to alter its behaviour conditionally 
depending on the perceived cue. For instance, if the cue is fairly unreliable, then the perceiver 
should consistently do whatever has the highest average payoff (i.e. what we call the ‘insular 
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strategy’). Clearly, if the intrinsic informational value of the cue is insufficient to cause the 
perceiver to give up on the insular strategy of always assuming condition C1 in favour of a 
strategy that is conditional on the cue, then there is no reason for the emitter to invest in 
reducing the informational content of the cue. Hence, we are particularly interested in 
combinations of parameters where (in the absence of investment by the emitter) is pays the 
perceiver to modify its behaviour in the light of the cue.  If investment in anti-attenuators by 
the perceiver is given by Kp, then a conditional strategy is superior to the insular strategy for 
the perceiver if and only if both of the following inequalities hold: 
(1 - P1)QW2 – P1(1 – Q)W1 – Kp > 0 
P1QW1 – (1 – P1)(1 – Q)W2 – Kp > 0 
The payoff to the insular strategy is (P1W11 + P2W12) if its default action is A1. The payoff to 
the conditional strategy is (P1QW11+P2QW22+P1(1−Q)W21+P2(1−Q)W12−Kp). Subtracting the 
insular payoff from the conditional one gives the condition for conditional one to be 
favoured. The second condition is obtained in an analogous way, but using a resident 
population with a default action A2. Generally, one of the insular strategies will be superior to 
the other. Without loss of generality, in this paper, we always select parameter values such 
that always taking action A1 is superior to always playing A2, and thus satisfying the first 
condition above will automatically mean the second condition is satisfied. Intuitively, the first 
condition will fail, and anti-attenuating traits will be selected against, whenever the cost of 
the traits,   , exceeds the benefits they confer. We separate the fidelity of the cue in reliably 
informing about the underlying state into two components: the fidelity of the cue as emitted 
(q); and the fidelity of the signal as perceived (Q). The first of these is a maximum value for 
the second, assuming perfect fidelity of transmission through the environment and perfect 
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detection by the perceiver. The fidelity of a cue as it is emitted, is necessarily a function of 
investment (Ke) by the emitter in attenuators, Specifically: 
                              (1) 
where Z describes the intrinsic informational value of the cue (in the absence of investment in 
attenuators) and may take any value from the range        . The positive constant α 
now represents the relative ease with which informational content of the cue is suppressed. 
The greater the value of α, the greater the decrease in the emitted fidelity of a cue that can be 
bought for a given level of investment. When there is no investment in attenuations (Ke = 0) 
then q = Z. With increasing investment in an attenuator (increasing value of the positive 
parameter Ke), the value of q declines, asymptoting at the completely uninformative state q = 
0.5.  
However, if Kp is the perceiver’s investment in an anti-attenuator then  
                             (2) 
where β is a positive constant which encapsulates the relative ease with which investment in 
an anti-attenuator improves fidelity of the cue. In the absence of investment in an anti-
attenuator by the perceiver (i.e. when Kp = 0), then Q = q and the fidelity of the cue as 
perceived is exactly as it was emitted by the other party. However, as Kp increases so Q 
increases, although this effect saturates and Q is bounded above at the value Z. Thus, no 
matter how heavily the emitter invests in attenuators (i.e. no matter how near q is to 0.5), the 
perceiver can recover up to the full informational content of the cue (Z) providing it is 
prepared to invest sufficiently in anti-attenuators. We adopted exponential forms for these 
functions to represent a situation common in biology and beyond where there are diminishing 
returns on increasing levels of investment. As we revisit in the Discussion, we do not except 
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our qualitative conclusions to be changed by modification of the shape of these functions (for 
example) linear or sigmoidal forms – and we leave such elaborations to more system-specific 
developments of the methodology presented here.    
It is worth noting that the zero equilibrium of the model, in which neither party invests in 
altering cue fidelity, is stable. As this equilibrium is dynamically uninteresting, we instead 
opt to displace the model from this equilibrium by initiating simulations using the above 
function for detected signal fidelity from a point in which one party (the emitter) already 
makes a small investment (it does not matter which one is selected). 
We simulated the dynamics of the model in R (version 3.3.3) for a range of conditional 
probabilities and parameter values. Simulations were run for 500 generations, and at each 
generation one of either Ke or Kp was randomly selected for mutation. Mutations took the 
form of the addition or subtraction of a randomly-generated number selected from a normal 
distribution (            ). Where this resulted in either Ke or Kp assuming a negative 
value, the change was discarded and another mutation was generated. Since it is only Q that 
takes a different value for mutants and residents, their relative fitness is dependent only on terms 
proportional to Q. Mutations that improved the fitness of the selected party were retained and 
provided the basis for subsequent mutations in future generations. Fitness values were 
calculated as follows: 
Wp = Q(P1W1+(1 – P1)W2) – Kp 
Ws =  Q(P1T1+(1 – P1)T2) – Ke, 
Conversely, mutations which decreased the fitness of the selected party were rejected (this is 
a similar approach to used in adaptive dynamics: Diekmann2002) . We continued this process 
until an equilibrium was identified or 4000 generations had elapsed. Specifically, from the 
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550
th
 generation onwards, the mean investment values for each party over the preceding 25 
generations were computed and compared to those of the 25 generations which in turn 
preceded them. If the mean investment of both parties was found to have remained 
unchanged over the focal 50 generation period, then the model was deemed to be at 
equilibrium. If an equilibrium was not identified within 4000 generations, often attributable 
to rapid antagonistic cycles of investment between the parties (an example of which is 
illustrated in Figure S1), then equilibrium values were approximated by taking their mean 
between the 500
th
 generation and the 4000
th
 generation. We exclude the initial 500 
generations to account for instances where the pertinent values for each party (investment, 
fitness and perceived/emitted fidelity) deviated substantially from their initial conditions 
before either attaining a fixed equilibrium or oscillating around an equilibrium. Further 
details and derivation can be found in Hackett et al. (2014, 2016).  
We explore two  different situations: (i) the two parties disagree on the perceiver behaviour 
they would prefer only when only one condition (   or   ) applies and (ii) they always 
disagree.  
 
Linking the model to the avian nesting example  
In the avian nesting example, the two potential conditions are that the tit has nested in 
either a good-quality or poor-quality territory. The cue relating to territory quality will 
be clutch size: large for a good-quality territory or small for a poor-quality territory. The 
options open to the flycatcher are either to share the territory with the tit or to move on 
and avoid sharing the territory. The flycatcher benefits from finding and sharing a good-
quality territory, but the optimal behaviour from its perspective if it correctly perceives 
the territory to be poor quality, is to depart and seek a good-quality territory elsewhere. 
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In some circumstances, the behaviour that benefits the flycatcher might also benefit the 
tit. That is, when the territory is poor quality then the tit might benefit from 
communicating this accurately to the flycatcher so the flycatcher departs, and the tit 
might also benefit from the flycatcher sharing its territory if the territory is good 
quality. This latter circumstance might occur if there is no real competition cost in a 
good-quality territory and there is some other benefit to the tit (for example, through 
dilution of risk of predation or collective defence against predation) from a flycatcher 
nesting nearby. In general, where the interests of the two parties always align then we 
would not expect attenuators or anti-attenuators to evolve (even if such adaptations are 
cost free).  
Next, we could imagine a situation where there is agreement in one situation but 
disagreement in the other. For example, the tit might always benefit if the flycatcher 
departs, but the flycatcher might do best by sharing when the territory is high quality 
but departing when the territory is poor quality. In this situation, there is agreement 
when the territory is low quality but disagreement when the territory is high quality. In 
such a situation, it might be possible to imagine a costly attenuator evolving, but only if 
the attenuator cannot be used selectively or when the flycatcher cannot detect the use 
of the attenuator. That is, when the egg-burying behaviour is not used only by tits in 
high-quality patches, or when the flycatcher cannot easily differentiate between a nest 
with buried eggs and a nest in which eggs have yet to be laid. Imagine a circumstance 
where tits bury eggs all the time. A mutant that only buried its eggs when the territory 
was good quality would benefit, because it would save costs of egg-burying and it would 
allow flycatchers to accurately see when it has laid a small clutch as an indicator of a 
low-quality patch. Thus, such mutants would spread through the population. But when 
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such mutants become widespread, then the benefit of egg-burying to tits is lost, because 
egg burial becomes a reliable cue of a high-quality territory to the flycatchers. In this 
situation, tits should be selected to give up paying the costs of burial. More generally, we 
would only expect use of attenuators in situations where there is partial conflict 
between the signaller and perceiver, in cases where the use of the attenuator does not 
itself become a reliable indicator of the condition it is selected to mask. Such reliable 
indication might be avoided if either (i) the perceiver cannot detect that the attenuator 
has been used and/or (ii) the attenuator cannot be used selectively according to the 
state of the trait that the perceiver is interested in.  
One can also imagine that the tit and flycatcher could agree on the course of action for 
high-quality patches but not for low-quality patches. This could occur where the tit 
always benefits from the flycatcher nesting nearby and sharing the territory, while the 
flycatcher does best by remaining in a good-quality territory but departing from a poor- 
quality one.  
We could imagine that the insular behaviour of the flycatcher which ignores information 
on territory quality from tit-clutch size could be to always depart from territories in 
which tits are nesting or always try to nest there. Either of these could be plausible – if 
competition is important in all but the highest-quality territories then (in the absence of 
further information) avoiding settling near a nesting tit might be a rational strategy; 
whereas if collective defence from predators is important, or tit nesting is a sign of a 
reasonably suitable local environment, then always nesting in close proximity could also 
be a plausible strategy in the absence of information on specific territory quality gained 
through observing tit-clutch size.  
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In terms of the costs and benefits of attenuators and anti-attenuators, the simplest 
model might be to consider that the cost paid by the tits reflects the fraction of 
occasions when it leaves the nest having buried the eggs, and burial deprives any 
flycatcher that looks in the box of any information on clutch size. The higher the cost 
paid by the tit, the more frequently they bury, and the more effectively they mask this 
cue. Flycatchers then make repeated visits to the box until they visit when the adults are 
not there but the eggs have not been buried and learn the true clutch size; the higher the 
investment the tit makes in burial, the higher the cost the flycatcher will have to pay in 
repeated visits to the nest to recover the information on clutch size. This cost of anti-
attenuators – in time and energy (and perhaps exposure to attack) – in repeated visits 
to the box, is more straightforward to apply than costs based on active uncovering of 
the eggs. Such uncovering behaviour will yield information in a relatively-complex 
manner, depending of the cognitive functioning of the flycatcher and the ease with 
which behaviour uncovers eggs.  
In general, it is also possible to imagine circumstances where there is conflict in both 
states. In the tit-flycatcher system, this might apply to a situation where if the territory 
is high quality then the tit would like to monopolise it, but it would prefer to share a 
poor-quality territory with the flycatcher; whereas, the flycatcher would benefit from 
nesting with a tit only in a high-quality territory. This seems relatively unlikely for this 
system. The flycatcher cost-benefits in this scenario are highly plausible – it is the 
situation for the tit that is more problematic. It is just possible to envisage a situation 
where in a low-quality territory, the tit benefits strongly from collective defence against 
predators, because the tit must often be away from the nest itself searching for food, 
whereas in a high-quality territory this benefit is less strong and the main concern for 
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the tit is avoidance of competition (or perhaps avoidance of the flycatcher’s activity 
attracting predators into the vicinity). This seems rather far-fetched for this system, but 
there is still benefit in studying this complete-conflict case in generality.   
 
Results  
In what follows we present equilibrium investment in attenuation   and anti-
attenuation   and the perceived fidelity of the cue  for two  conflict scenarios: conflict 
in a single condition only and conflict in both conditions (total conflict). Results are 
presented for three values of the intrinsic informational value of the cue   (0.6, 0.75 & 
0.9). Given that a similar functional form was observed in the equilibrium values of 
perceiver and emitter investment for all three values of   for each parameterisation we 
directly present only results for simulations with        here while results for 
simulations with       and       are available in the Supplementary Materials. For 
each value of  , simulations were repeated for three values of   (1,3 & 5) and eleven 
values of   (from 0 to 5 in increments of 0.5), where   and   respectively determine the 
ease of cue attenuation and detection.  Unless otherwise stated, the perceiver payoffs 
are           and the default condition occurs with probability       .  
Conflict in one condition 
Figure 1 depicts equilibrium investment   by each party (Fig.1a) and the perceived 
fidelity of the cue  (Fig.1b) for a conflict in the default condition where the emitter 
payoffs are              and       . Equilibrium investment and perceived cue 
fidelity for       and       are provided in Figures S2 and S3 respectively. 
Equilibrium investment by each party, and the range of   values over which evolution 
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occurs, increases as the intrinsic informational value of the cue   increases. The greater 
the correspondence between the focal cue and the conflict condition, the greater the 
selection on the emitter to suppress the information, which in turn selects for anti-
attenuation by the perceiver. For a given combination of   and   there is a range of   
values over which emitters will evolve attenuation but perceivers are not selected to 
retaliate. The width of this range contracts as   and   are increased and perceivers 
evolve anti-attenuating traits more readily. Thus, for a given parameterisation, there is 
some threshold level of attenuation which is beneficial to the emitter but which can be 
tolerated by the perceiver. That is, for levels of attenuation below this threshold, anti-
attenuation is not economical for perceivers. When   is great enough that the emitter 
can either attain or surpass this attenuation threshold, anti-attenuation becomes 
profitable to the perceiver.  Intuitively, it follows that the greater the payoffs available to 
the perceiver in the conflict condition, the lower the values of   and   required to 
promote perceiver evolution and the less tolerant of any level of attenuation the 
perceiver becomes (see Fig.5). 
Over the range of conditions for which both parties evolve to non-zero investment, the 
equilibrium value of  remains fixed at some value which represents a compromise 
between the incentives of each party and is sensitive to both   and  . The sensitivity to 
  is intuitive, the greater the value of  , the greater the effort required by the emitter to 
attenuate the fidelity of the cue to low values.  That is, the emitter’s preferred value of  
is a reflection of its payoffs, which determine how much is at stake and how much the 
emitter can afford to spend before attenuation becomes unprofitable. For a given set of 
payoffs, larger values of   ensure the emitter reaches this tipping point at a greater 
value of Q (Fig.S3). Conversely, the lower the value of  , the closer the emitter can 
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theoretically drive  towards the minimum value of     before further attenuation 
ceases to be beneficial (assuming no retaliation by the perceiver, Fig.S2). The value of   
determines the influence of the perceiver. As   increases, the cost-efficiency of anti-
attenuation increases and the perceiver will evolve anti-attenuating traits for lower 
values of  . That is, when effective anti-attenuation requires only a small investment the 
perceiver is less tolerant of attenuation. Thus as   increases, emitter investment 
decreases and the equilibrium value of  tends towards  .  
When the emitter evolves attenuation in isolation, its investment increases as   
increases and the equilibrium value of  tends towards the emitter’s preferred value. 
Once   becomes sufficiently large that the perceiver is selected to counter the 
attenuation, emitter investment decreases with further increases to  . In contrast, for 
given values of   and  , perceiver investment increases with increasing  . When both 
parties can co-evolve, increasing   does not change the equilibrium value of  ; the 
equilibrium value of  is now specified by   and   as detailed above. Thus, if anti-
attenuation serves to prevent further attenuation of  , the changes in the investment of 
each party as   increases and the environment becomes more conducive to attenuation 
can be understood in terms of cost efficiency. Greater values of   allow the emitter to 
‘purchase’ greater attenuation for less. Thus, if  is to be further attenuated and 
consequently significantly impact perceiver performance, the perceiver is committed to 
increasing investment in anti-attenuation to counter the improved spending power of 
the emitter.  It follows that, if   enables the emitter to achieve more for less and the 
antagonism of the perceiver renders further decreases to  difficult, then the emitter 
can improve its fitness by investing less to achieve the same outcome.  Put simply, anti-
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attenuation imposes a ceiling on emitter investment; the more easily the emitter can 
attenuate the cue, the harder the perceiver must work to maintain this ceiling.   
 
The frequency of the conflict condition is a key factor in facilitating the evolution of 
attenuation. If the conflict occurs in the less frequent non-default condition, the 
potential costs to the emitter must be extremely high and the focal cue sufficiently 
informative for attenuation to evolve. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows 
equilibrium investment by each party and the perceived fidelity of the cue when the 
emitter payoffs are               and       . Values for       and       
are shown in Figures S4 and S5 respectively. There is no evolution when       (Fig.S4 
and where evolution does occur, it is of a lesser magnitude and for a narrower range of 
  values than observed for a conflict in the default condition (c.f. Fig.1 and Fig.2).  For 
      the high cost to the emitter in the conflict condition is mitigated by both the 
condition’s rarity and the relative unreliability of the cue. That is, even if the conflict 
condition occurs and the cue can be perceived, the perceiver is still likely to select the 
emitter’s preferred action given that the correlation between the cue and the prevailing 
condition is weak, being only slightly better than random. The infrequency of the 
conflict also buffers the emitter for larger values of   where attenuation is favoured, 
selecting only for low levels of attenuation. Otherwise, when evolution does occur, the 
same qualitative outcomes are observed as for conflict in the default condition. Notably, 
irrespective of the change to the emitter payoffs, the equilibrium value of   when 
reciprocal evolution between both parties occurs is not significantly reduced (c.f. Fig.1b 
and Fig.2b). This reinforces the point that it is the perceiver payoffs and their 
interaction with   and   which dictate the point at which reciprocal investment occurs; 
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the emitter payoffs instead act in conjunction with the value of   and   to determine 
whether attenuation is beneficial to the emitter in the first instance.  
 
Conflict in both conditions  
A total conflict scenario, in which the parties disagree with respect to the best perceiver 
action in both conditions, increases equilibrium investment by both parties and extends 
the range of   values over which evolution occurs. However, the observed trends are 
otherwise similar to those reported for conflict in the default condition, and the same 
qualitative behaviours are exhibited. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts 
equilibrium investment by each party and the resulting perceived fidelity of the cue for 
a total conflict scenario with emitter payoffs               and       . Results 
with       and       are respectively shown in Figures S6 and S7.  The perceived 
fidelity of the cue at equilibrium when reciprocal evolution occurs is not significantly 
changed relative to conflict in exclusively one condition; this is in spite of the potential 
for greater losses to each party for a given value of  when total conflict pertains.  
 
There is an asymmetry between the value of each condition to both parties; the non-
default condition is infrequent (occurring 20% of the time) and, thus, parties experience 
the greatest loss/potential for gain in the more-frequent default condition, which then 
has the greatest influence in shaping the observed-evolutionary responses. For the 
parameterisation shown in Figure 3, doubling the value of the non-default condition to 
the emitter produces only a small increase in equilibrium investment (not shown). In 
contrast, doubling the value of the default condition produces pronounced increases in 
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emitter investment and promotes attenuation for lower values of  . This is illustrated in 
Figure 4 for the emitter payoffs                and       . Figures S8 and S9 
illustrate results for this payoff scenario when       and       respectively.  In 
spite of the increase in emitter investment, the equilibrium value of   during reciprocal 
evolution remains unchanged relative to Figure 3. As noted previously, the equilibrium 
value of  when both parties are selected is determined by the incentives and 
constraints acting upon the perceiver; it is unlikely that the emitter can substantively 
influence this value so long as it is also beneficial for the perceiver to invest. However, 
while there is no perceptible decrease in the equilibrium value of  between Figures 3 
and 4, the increased emitter investment in Figure 4 does translate into an extremely-
small decrease in the value of  (from between three to five decimal places, depending 
on the parameter combination) and the greatest differences are observed where     
and anti-attenuation does not evolve, whilst the smallest differences occur when anti-
attenuation is also favoured.  The mismatch between the extent of the increase in 
emitter investment and the change in the final value of   draws attention to (i) the 
difficulty in further reducing the value of  as it approaches the emitter’s preferred 
value and (ii) the difficulty in attaining any further decrease in the value of   in the 
presence of anti-attenuation.  The selection pressure acting on the emitter must be 
considerable (as in Figure 4) if the increasingly- marginal returns on further attenuation 
are to be beneficial. 
 
If the value of the default condition is instead doubled for the perceiver as opposed to 
the emitter, then there is a pronounced increase in perceiver investment for all values of 
  and   and the perceiver will evolve anti-attenuation for lower values of   than 
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previously. This is illustrated for a total conflict scenario in Figure 5, with the emitter 
payoffs              ,the perceiver payoffs              and       . 
Figures S10 and S11 respectively illustrate outcomes for       and      . Elevated 
perceiver investment translates into a reduction in emitter investment relative to 
Figure 3, which utilised the same emitter payoffs, and equilibrium values of   which are 
closer to  . Thus, as indicated earlier, the greater the potential losses to the perceiver 
resulting from a decrease in the availability of useful information, the less tolerant of 
any reduction in the perceived fidelity of this information the perceiver becomes. 
However, the perceiver is not able to completely obviate the value of what suppression 
the emitter is able to achieve; even for environments amenable to the perception of the 
cue (   ), the emitter evolves to a non-zero equilibrium.  
 
Discussion 
There are a huge number of social situations where one party’s interests are damaged 
by another party gaining information about the focal individual. These two parties 
might be potential mates, competitors, parents, parent and offspring, or predator and 
prey (to name a few). In such situations, the focal individual might be selected to mask 
that information, and the other party selected to resist this masking. In this paper, we 
explore the evolution of such a situation in a very general setting. Our simulations have 
allowed us to draw a number of conclusions.  
To summarise, emitters are selected to attenuate cues when the costs arising from the 
perception of the cue accrue sufficiently often and are of adequate magnitude. The rate 
at which costs accrue depends upon the frequency of the conflict and the intrinsic 
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informational value of the cue in the absence of attenuation. The less frequent the 
conflict, or the less reliable the cue, the weaker the selection in favour of attenuation 
becomes. Hence, a conflict with a small cost will select for attenuation if it arises 
frequently and the cue reliably elicits the incorrect (from the perspective of the emitter) 
response from the perceiver, while a rare conflict must carry a higher cost before 
attenuation is favoured; there is little value in suppressing a cue that is not consistently 
damaging. The extent to which a given cue can be attenuated depends upon the 
interaction between (i) the ease of attenuation, (ii) the payoffs available to the emitter, 
(iii) the intrinsic informational value of the cue and (iv) the response of the perceiver.  
The first three factors create a ceiling on emitter investment beyond which further 
investment ceases to be beneficial and so impose an absolute lower limit on the 
perceived fidelity of the cue. Thus, even in a scenario for which the perceiver is never 
selected to invest, the emitter is unlikely to be able to fully suppress the cue unless 
attenuation is decidedly cost-effective. Investment in anti-attenuation by the perceiver 
lowers the ceiling on emitter investment and maintains the perceived fidelity of the cue 
at a greater value. The perceiver is selected to invest where attenuation meaningfully 
encroaches upon the perceiver’s rewards; the greater the stakes, the less tolerant of 
attenuation the emitter becomes.  For all three considered conflicts, there were three 
classes of outcome. First, no evolution occurs. This can be considered a victory to the 
perceiver; the prevailing conditions do not facilitate the evolution of attenuation and the 
perceiver will always be able to extract the full informational value of the cue. Second, 
attenuation evolves but the perceiver is not selected to respond. This represents a 
victory to the emitter, but is generally limited to scenarios where the extent of 
attenuation is too low to trigger a response from the perceiver; these cases tend to be 
constrained to conditions where the conflict has limited value to the perceiver, or 
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additional investment in detecting and recognising the cue is inefficient. Finally, 
reciprocal evolution occurs and both attenuation and anti-attenuation evolve. Neither 
party achieves its favoured outcome in this instance but, depending upon the incentives 
acting upon the perceiver, it is possible for one party to have an overriding influence 
upon the final perceived fidelity of the cue: the greater the selection upon the perceiver 
to maintain the perceived fidelity of the cue, the more the final outcome resembles the 
perceiver’s optimum.  
Our modelling approach assumes that the anti-attenuator trait is able to somehow 
reconcile the information content of the attenuated signal by partially ‘recovering’ the 
intrinsic information content of the cue. In the flycatcher example, this was done by 
investing a certain amount of time to uncover the eggs. However, this is not the only 
way in which an attenuator can be countered. For example, the anti-attenuator could 
directly affect the cost (e.g., alpha) of producing the attenuator itself. While not directly 
applicable to the flycatcher scenario, one way in which this might work is when the 
perceiver stays close to the emitter so that it may take the emitter more time to hide the 
cue. In this case,  eq. [2] would not necessarily reflect the mechanism involved and the 
co-evolutionary dynamic might thus be different. This situation might perhaps imply 
that when a perceiver is able to invest in a cheap anti-attenuator trait, the emitter 
simply cannot evolve an attenuator due to prohibitive cost, but more formal elaboration 
of this different form of anti-attenuation would be a fruitful development of the work 
described here. It is also possible to imagine different shapes to the functional forms for 
the link between costs and effectivenesses of attenuators and anti-attenuators to the 
ones considered here. The most obvious alternative would be one that implied that 
there had to be an initial substantial investment before there was any payback in 
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effectiveness. When this is true for attenuators then we would expect that the 
parameter space involving no investment in attentuators would grow; where it is true 
for anti-attentuators then we would expect that this may increase the range of 
conditions where perceivers tolerate moderate amounts of attenuation without 
investing in counter-measures.  It is important to note that we find the evolution of 
investment in costly information-masking even in situations where there is partial 
commonality of interest between the two parties (i.e in the situation explored in the 
results where there is conflict of interest in one condition but not in the other). That is, 
we show that costly information-masking can evolve even if there are some conditions  
(but not all conditions) where emitter and perceiver agree on the preferred action of the 
perceiver.  . This is important, because we would not expect information-masking to be 
used selectively only in advantageous situations, because then deployment of the mask 
itself becomes informative. That is, a potential mate could not evolve to only mask his 
condition when in poor condition if the implementation of the masking can be detected 
and itself offers a reliable cue of poor quality. Bogaardt & Johnstone (2016) 
demonstrated that amplifiers can easily evolve to become informative and become a 
signal in their own right. Selectively-used attenuators have analogous evolutionary 
potential, and so we would expect that (unless deployment of attenuators can be 
undetectable to perceivers) they will be used in the unselective way described here. 
Importantly, we demonstrate that such attenuators can be evolutionary stable even if 
they are costly, even if they are sometimes disadvantageous, and even if a perceiver can 
mount counter-measures to them. As such, we feel that attenuators of cues may be 
deserving of much more attention from researchers of sensory interactions between 
animals.  
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1: Equilibrium investment      in attenuating and anti-attenuating traits by each 
party (a) and the perceived fidelity of the cue ( ) at equilibrium (b ) for the emitter payoff 
scenario             .  The parties disagree with respect to the best perceiver action 
in the default condition which occurs with probability   =0.8. The perceiver payoffs are 
            . Equilibrium values are plotted for each value of   (the ease with 
which the focal cue is detected in a given environment) plotted against   (the ease with 
which the informational value of the cue can be attenuated in a given environment) for 
        where   represents the intrinsic informational value of the cue. Panel a display 
the change in the equilibrium cost of attenuation and anti-attenuation (values of Ke and 
Kp) for each party for a given value of β as α increases. In all instances, blue lines denote 
changes in the relevant emitter variable while red lines indicate changes in the 
corresponding perceiver variable. Panel b illustrate the corresponding changes in the 
perceived fidelity of the cue at equilibrium produced by the investment of each party in 
panel a for a given value of β as α increases.   
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Figure 2: As for Figure 1 but with conflict in the non-default condition and emitter payoffs 
             .  
Figure 3: As for Figure 1 but with conflict in both conditions.  
Figure 4: As for Figure 3 but with the emitter payoffs               .  
Figure 5: As for Figure 3 but with the perceiver payoffs             . 
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Figure 4 
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